ANTTILA, STEN TORBJORN; FILDR
UPPSALA UNIVERSITET (SWEDEN), 1994
SOCIOLOGY, THEORY AND METHODS (0344)
The consequences of four fundamental methodological problems in macro-sociology
are examined. The
first problem concerns the use of nation-states as units of analysis in comparative
research and is
investigated in relation to a correlational study of the causes of democracy.
It is argued that when
nation-states are the units of analysis, the statistical assumption of independent
observations is violated,
a difficulty known as Galton's problem. If a holistic approach is adopted where
the independence of units
is not assumed but investigated, Galton's problem is avoided. This implies,
however, that many additional
assumptions must be introduced concerning the interrelations among units thus
making it practically
impossible to test the models under investigation. The second problem regards
the choice of empirical
criteria used in the periodization of macro-historical processes and is related
to studies of capitalist
evolution based on analyses of long waves and capitalist organization. It is
claimed that a variety of
indicators can be specified for the identification of periods when the concepts
used in the theory are
empirically vague. Consequently, different periodizations can be supported depending
on the specific
indicators chosen. The third problem refers to the empirical support of macro-sociological
theories and is
analyzed in relation to the claim decreasing nationalization of politics indicates
the end of organized
capitalism. It is argued that the linkage between the theory and the empirical
illustration is dubious. Owing
to implicit assumptions and vague concepts, observable implications cannot be
deduced from the
theory. It is concluded that when a strictly deductive approach is adopted only
a few empirical cases can
be studied simultaneously. Finally, the fourth problem concerns the theoretical
consequences of social
science images of large social systems. This problem is examined in relation
to the image of liberal
democracy as a political thermostat. It is claimed that verbal images of macro-social
processes conceal
complex relations. When these images are formally specified as models, the implied
pattern of behaviour
of large social systems may counter the expectations based on the original image.
A computer simulation
of the interaction between the electorate and the government is carried out
showing that whether or not
a model of liberal democracy behaves as a political thermostat depends on the
exact way in which the
model is formally specified. Assumptions that may seem unimportant or minor
modifications of the model
may completely alter the behaviour of the system. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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Systems Simulation Group
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